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Crises create good opportunities to question flawed or outdated practices. A 
new era of credit rating agency regulation began with the onset of the 2008 
global ﬁnancial crisis.  The previous ‘light-touch’ approach based on self-
regulation has been abandoned for a mandatory system of credit rating 
agency regulation and supervision. Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are now 
subject to more intensiﬁed oversight on both sides of the Atlantic. In the 
US, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has an expanded 
mandate to regulate the credit rating agencies. In the EU, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has been granted exclusive and 
centralized supervisory powers over these private firms (Quaglia, 2013).  
Credit rating involves estimating the likely future losses for investors in 
securities who are not familiar with the financial condition of the issuing 
company or government. Rating agencies emerged in the United States in 
the first quarter of the Twentieth Century (Sinclair, 2005; Ouroussoff, 
2010). Moody’s Investors Service and S&P Global Ratings (formerly 
Standard & Poor’s), both headquartered in New York City, are the two most 
important agencies. Fitch Ratings, owned by Hearst Corporation, with 
headquarters split between New York and London, has risen in importance 
in the last twenty years. Analysts often refer to Moody’s, S&P and Fitch as 
the ‘Big Three.’ 
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Increased oversight, ongoing evaluation of rating performance data, 
models and methodology, and the statutory authorization to conduct on-
site investigations, seem, at ﬁrst glance, promising avenues to reduce the 
probability of ‘rating failure’ and enhance rating quality. But will the new 
regulations really make a difference? Whether these reform efforts are 
effective in addressing the fundamental problems of rating, is, as this article 
argues, highly questionable. The higher regulatory costs might not 
contribute to ‘better’ ratings or make ‘rating failure’ less likely. ‘That isn’t to 
say that nothing has been done, just that what’s been done is disturbingly 
beside the point,’ as Michael Lewis (2016) puts it regarding the ﬁnancial 
regulatory response to the crisis in general.1  
We claim that an erroneous understanding of rating as metrics, private 
goods, independent and neutral third-party opinions contributes to the 
ineffectiveness of credit rating agency regulation, and indirectly, to 
reinforcement of the credit rating agencies’ authority. Effective credit rating 
agency regulation instead would provide the means to challenge the credit 
rating agencies’ authority. It would put in place institutional checks and 
balances, preventing credit rating from being a systemic risk factor in the 
global economy, as is still the case. Despite the rating failures experienced 
during the last fifteen years, CRAs ‘still matter’ in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis (Roubini, 2015). Turning to credit rating agencies for 
spotting rising credit risk has remained a common practice in ﬁnancial 
markets. Whether debt issuers are corporates, financial institutions or 
sovereigns, the continuing reliance on ratings by market participants and 
regulatory authorities suggests the agencies’ authority is intact.  
To understand this outcome, the explanation advanced here goes 
3 
beyond market participants’ individual motivations to use ratings rather 
than alternatives for credit risk assessment. We show how dominant 
cognitive constructions can be consequential, as commonly shared 
understandings of rating and CRAs affect the actions and non-actions of 
regulators and market participants. In other words, how we conceive of 
ratings and CRAs is constitutive of their authority.   
We first show how the regulatory license approach – a common way of 
thinking about credit rating agencies – in its ‘reversed’ version continues to 
contribute to misunderstanding the agencies’ authority. Second, we 
examine the dominant understandings of rating underlying the avowed 
goals of credit rating agency regulation, including competition, 
transparency and disclosure, plus reduction in market and regulatory 
reliance on ratings. We discuss how understanding ratings as metrics, 
private goods, independent and neutral third-party opinions contribute to 
regulatory ineffectiveness. Third, we illustrate how these understandings 
can also account for the ‘non-events’ of regulatory reform, as the 
persistence of established rating analytics, the traditional business model 
and the non-establishment of a public credit rating agency demonstrate. 
The article ends by suggesting better ways of thinking about credit rating 
agencies, and consequently, of regulating them.  
 
The regulatory license hypothesis ‘reversed’  
Post-crisis credit rating agency regulation has generated criticism since it 
began (McVea, 2010). In terms of its ability to prevent the failures leading 
up to the global financial crisis, De Haan and Amtenbrink (2011: 33) 
question whether the regime under Regulation 1060/2009 in the EU will 
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make ‘a decisive difference compared to the previously existing mix of 
regulation and self-regulation.’ Barducci and Fest (2011: 55) conclude the  
credit rating industry itself would have been able to cure its 
reputation damaged by current ﬁnancial turmoil. Accordingly, 
recent regulations have, if any, solely the effect to conciliate the 
(sic) public opinion.  
Amtenbrink and Heine (2013: 13) argue the legislative initiatives both in 
the United States and the EU ‘aimed at increasing the regulatory oversight 
over credit rating agencies activities, where non-binding international 
standards and self-commitment were thought to have failed’ are not a 
surprising ‘reaction to market failure.’ Such a ‘countermovement towards 
regulation’ was predictable. The authors question whether registration and 
certiﬁcation systems are ‘not in fact counterproductive.’ Insights from 
behavioural science suggest to them public regulation triggers even ‘further 
overconﬁdence’ in credit ratings and, accordingly, increases over-reliance; 
‘by introducing numerous measures geared towards increasing the quality 
and reliability of credit ratings, investors are not exactly discouraged from 
relying on ratings’ (Amtenbrink and Heine, 2013: 12). 
The argument that an intensiﬁed regulation of credit rating agencies 
signals public approval of ratings, and, therefore, contributes to even 
greater rating use resembles, as we call it, the regulatory license hypothesis 
‘reversed.’ According to the original formulation of the ‘regulatory license 
hypothesis,’ the credit rating agencies’ authority is the consequence of 
delegating credit risk regulation to private firms (Partnoy, 2006). This 
delegation allowed the CRAs to fulfil a quasi-public governing function, 
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although not themselves subject to regulation.  
In view of the regulations implemented after the global financial crisis, 
the ‘regulatory license hypothesis reversed’ suggests regulation of credit 
rating agencies is important to the reproduction of the credit rating 
agencies ‘as recognized and trustworthy private authority’ (Kruck, 2016: 
765) and complicit in a ‘progressive institutionalization [...] of their role as 
private governors’ (Kruck, 2016: 754). Both versions of the regulatory 
license hypothesis, whether the original or the reversed, regard the 
involvement of public authorities—be it in the form of the regulatory use of 
ratings only, or of additional regulation of credit rating agencies themselves 
—as supporting and expanding credit rating agencies’ authority.  
 
Understandings of rating implicit in regulations 
‘Competition’ and ‘transparency’ have ever been prevailing regulatory goals 
in the discourse of rating regulation, in both the past and present. Since the 
global financial crisis, there is also an explicit effort to reduce ‘over-reliance’ 
on credit ratings in market and regulatory practices. We argue these 
prominent goals reveal an underlying understanding of rating that accounts 
for the ineffectiveness of these regulations. The understanding of what 
rating is – and, implicitly, how the credit rating agencies’ authority is 
conceived – inﬂuences the view of how rating works, and when it does not 
work. These ideas establish a notion of what rating failure is, 
predetermining the spectrum of regulatory measures thought appropriate 
remedies. If the underlying understanding of rating is erroneous, then the 
regulations that follow will not work. 
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Competition  
Conventional accounts interpret the credit rating agencies’ commercial 
success as arising from weak competition. The idea that the enhancement 
of competition can reduce the ﬂaws in the rating industry and promote 
rating ‘objectivity’ is not new. In the US, it goes back at least to the Credit 
Rating Agencies Reform Act of 2006. In the EU, the promotion of 
competition and more market players in the credit rating market is part of 
post global financial crisis regulation (European Commission, 2013). The 
scholarly literature never tires of recommending ‘a competitive 
environment’ as the ‘means to achieve better credit ratings’ (Darbellay, 
2013: 9; Amtenbrink and Heine, 2013: 2).  
According to economic theory, regulation constrains ‘monopoly power 
and [aids] the prevention of serious distortions to competition’ 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009: 2). Weak competition leads to poor analysis as 
the credit rating agencies lack incentives to reinvest in their product. From 
this perspective, regulatory measures should increase the degree of 
competition to bring about a ‘better’ market outcome, i.e. higher quality 
ratings.  
Striving for a level playing ﬁeld and reducing entry barriers for smaller 
market players—noble as these goals may be—will not automatically 
diminish the probability of rating failure and improve rating quality. The 
global rating market consists of more than 80 players, but the Big Three 
still hold more than 90 percent of market share (Mattarocci, 2014: 121). 
This suggests a stable equilibrium between smaller market players and the 
Big Three, where the former either operate locally or are specialized in 
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niche markets and speciﬁc sectors (Coffee, 2011: 248). Building strategic 
alliances with the Big Three benefits small agencies in terms of reputation, 
publicity, and credibility, whereas the large credit rating agencies can 
reinforce their dominant global market position through these 
relationships. This ‘win-win situation’ seems to underpin the oligopolistic 
market structure of the status quo.  
Empirical evidence suggests a high concentration in the CRA market 
(European Commission, 2016: 8). Not only are the revenues of credit rating 
activity in general highly concentrated, market concentration also exists 
across different rating types, whether corporates, sovereigns or in 
structured finance. There exists a ‘general preference towards large CRAs’ 
and a ‘common view among investors (and issuers) that small credit rating 
agencies provide lower quality ratings compared to large credit rating 
agencies’ (European Commission, 2016: 5-6). Against this background, it is 
not surprising regulations aimed at promoting competition and increasing 
the number of smaller market players are not effective in diminishing the 
probability of rating failure and improving rating quality. Instead, the 
oligopoly seems to be a constitutive feature of the rating market.  
A rating provides a centralized judgment about creditworthiness. By 
deﬁnition, this function can only be fulﬁlled with a limited number of rating 
suppliers. With an inﬁnite number of suppliers, as perfect competition 
implies, the raison d’être of the industry would evaporate. Therefore, 
reputational entry barriers are not only the cause for the low degree of 
competition, but a necessary feature of how rating has worked for the last 
century. The concentration of market share is the inevitable consequence.  
One regulatory lesson to draw from this is that fostering competition 
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will not automatically lead to the desired ends. Regulators must 
acknowledge the constitutive character of the reputational entry barriers, 
which cannot simply be regulated ‘away.’ Related to this, they should 
beware of equating these barriers with a presumptive track record of the 
incumbent oligopoly. Reputation is inherently exclusive and not necessarily 
‘meritocratic.’ It favours the status quo. Therefore, the idea that smaller 
agencies can catch up with the Big Three by ‘developing a track record 
score’ over time is an empty promise (European Commission, 2016: 8). 
Transparency and disclosure  
What Kessler (2016: 359) describes as the ‘transparency discourse,’ which 
traces back at least to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of the late 1990s,
 
continues 
in the realm of credit rating agency regulation.
 
‘Higher transparency’ is one 
of, if not the dominant theme of credit rating agency regulation. The idea 
that transparency can cure the ﬂaws of the rating industry is a recipe to be 
found, for example, in the ﬁrst version of the IOSCO Code (IOSCO, 2004: 
3) and in the Credit Rating Agencies Reform Act of 2006. There may be 
differences between jurisdictions regarding scope, or debates about 
whether more ‘process’ or ‘output’ oriented approaches are better. But the 
perception that there is a fundamental transparency deﬁcit in the industry 
in need of repair is widely shared among regulators, policymakers, and 
scholars alike. Given this, the CRAs themselves, independently of 
regulations imposed on them, have put transparency measures in place. 
Embracing transparency, one of the much-heralded values in the market 
place, has allowed the CRAs to signal their learning ability and, with it, 
their epistemic authority, is still intact.  
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In the following, let us have a closer look at the different areas 
suffering from a presumptive transparency deficit, and where regulations 
are supposed to make a difference.  
     
… in terms of registration 
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 put an end to the ‘old (and 
vague) NRSRO system’ establishing criteria for NRSRO recognition 
(Brummer and Loko, 2014: 160; Sinclair, 2013: 88). In the aftermath of the 
crisis, the US has formalized registration to facilitate market access for new 
NRSRO candidates further. The SEC has enhanced disclosure requirements 
for the registration process as a quality-safeguarding mechanism (Hiss and 
Nagel, 2014: 140). Also, the EU introduced a registration duty for credit 
rating agencies in the wake of global financial crisis reform efforts. Before 
the financial crisis, European countries de facto adopted the CRA 
recognition model from the US without deﬁning formal procedures of their 
own. This ‘free-riding on American regulatory efforts’ was facilitated by the 
fact that the largest agencies were headquartered in the United States 
(Sinclair, 2013: 88).  
Nobody can seriously claim the rating failures of the past happened 
because of a ‘shadow’ credit rating industry operating off the regulatory 
radar. The Big Three were anything but unknown or unacknowledged 
players. Against this backdrop, it is questionable whether institutionalized 
registration and recognition procedures are effective tools to prevent a 
future rating ﬁasco.  
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… in terms of methodology 
Increasing the transparency of rating methodology has also been a popular 
reform measure since the global financial crisis (IOSCO, 2015; European 
Commission 2013).2 Proponents of such ‘process-based’ approaches 
emphasize the importance of opening the ‘black box’ of rating to increase 
rating quality and prevent rating failure (Kiff et al., 2012; Vernazza et al., 
2014).  
Credit rating agencies themselves have put great effort into 
publicizing the rating process, as a cursory glance at their websites shows. 
Given the criticism the agencies faced during the crisis, some described 
these efforts as a ‘pretty-looking PR campaign’ to restore reputation, 
without effect on the actual practices (Blodget, 2011).  
Roubini (2015) advocates objectivity is best achieved if rating 
becomes the product of veriﬁable statistical models and algorithms. These 
ideas suggest a probabilistic understanding of rating, which gets wrong the 
reality of what rating is. Unlike mere calculation, qualitative and 
quantitative components are mixed in a way that renders their 
differentiation ex post impossible. Ratings involve judgement; they are not 
unambiguous figures, but products of deliberation. If ratings were 
computable and predictable, there would be no business case for credit 
rating agencies. If promoting rating preciseness, correctness and absence of 
errors, is the ultimate end of enhancing transparency of rating 
methodology, such measures will be ineffective in fostering rating quality 
and preventing rating failure. 
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… in terms of conﬂicts of interest  
New regulations aim to mitigate the distorting impact of conﬂicts of interest 
on rating quality. Given that eliminating conﬂicts of interest altogether is 
out of reach under the current business model of ‘issuer-pays,’ enhanced 
‘disclosure’ requirements are treated as an alternative means to address the 
issue. While the EU adopts a more general approach, the US requires 
detailed descriptions depending on the type of conﬂicts of interest (Hiss 
and Nagel, 2014: 140).  
As these transparency and disclosure measures mainly affect the 
conﬂicts of interest at the individual analyst level, critics have been quick to 
point out that structural conﬂicts of interest continue to exist. The new 
transparency requirements are ‘a distraction from the principal conﬂict of 
interest that distorts ratings, namely, the NRSROs’ imperative to maximize 
revenues and earnings’ (Gaillard and Harrington, 2016: 52). Indeed, the 
European Commission maintains that ‘none of the requirements related to 
conﬂicts of interest affected [credit rating agencies and issuers] in a 
signiﬁcant way, and as such they cannot be described as either positive or 
negative’ (European Commission, 2016: 6). Based on market participants’ 
views, there is little evidence ‘to draw any ﬁrm conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the disclosure provision’ borne by issuers (European 
Commission, 2016: 9). 
Why should enhanced transparency make a difference beyond the 
purely symbolic? Rendering conﬂicts of interest more transparent does not 
mean they cease to exist. Conflicts of interest in the industry were not a 
secret in the years preceding the crisis.  
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The attempt to boost rating quality by making conﬂicts of interest more 
transparent reveals a certain conception of rating failure. Rating failure is 
constructed as the inevitable consequence of the rent-seeking behaviour of 
rational, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. It is taken for granted that credit rating 
agencies are incentivized to please issuers more than investors, resulting in 
less severe ratings. Conﬂicts of interest and their consequences are thus 
accepted as given. Increased transparency is therefore not supposed to 
erase, but to mitigate the distorting effects of conﬂicts of interest on the 
quality of ratings. The underlying logic is that the public eye has a 
disciplining effect on credit rating agencies’ ‘natural’ behaviour of profit-
maximization. 
Understanding rating as such is not problematic per se. After all, no one 
can deny the conﬂicts of interest at work in the rating industry. Such a 
perspective becomes harmful, however, when it silences other causes of 
rating failure that go beyond the rational-choice approach. Unlike market 
concentration that poses the same regulatory challenge regardless of rating 
type, when it comes to conflicts of interest, differentiating between rating 
types can reveal shortcomings of dominant rating regulations.   
In the case of sovereign ratings, rating agencies issue unsolicited 
sovereign ratings without being paid by the sovereign bond issuer. ‘Rating 
failure’ occurs nonetheless. For example, Barta and Johnston (2018) 
provide empirical evidence of partisan-biased sovereign rating downgrades 
and resulting ‘partisan discrimination’ in sovereign bond markets. 
Likewise, the Asian financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
gave rise to a body of literature that discusses further facets of ‘sovereign 
rating failure.’ Fuchs and Gehring (2017) show how sovereign ratings have 
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suffered from a ‘home bias’ in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
2008. The ‘Big Three’ have given European states excessively severe 
sovereign ratings compared to the U.S. sovereign rating. Similarly, Gärtner 
and Griesbach (2012) suggest that ratings have a nonlinear effect on 
interest rates, facilitating self-fulfilling prophecy scenarios in sovereign 
debt markets.3 In another study, Gärtner et al. (2011) find that economic 
fundamentals cannot explain sovereign ratings during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Variation differs both in the past and across countries. 
In the wake of the East Asian financial crisis 1997-98, CRAs were 
criticized for being ‘excessively conservative’ and downgrading countries 
more than economic fundamentals would justify (Ferri et al., 1999). 
Attaching ‘higher weights to their qualitative judgment’ than to economic 
fundamentals, Ferri et al. (1999: 394) identify a procyclical role of the 
rating agencies on the market’s credit risk perception, which aggravated the 
East Asian crisis.4 
Regulators should refrain from interpreting every rating problem as one 
of incentives and conﬂicts of interest.  Transparency is not a magic bullet.  
 
… in terms of rating performance  
Advocates of ‘results-based’ approaches to regulation have criticized the 
latest reforms for their focus on ‘process-based intervention.’ More output 
orientation ‘would create innovation-boosting consequences of rating 
failures, while keeping governments out of the ratings kitchen’ (Persaud, 
2009: 16). Focusing on performance indicators, sometimes also referred to 
as rating history or the ‘track-record,’ is an output-oriented approach to 
credit rating agency regulation that has increased in popularity since the 
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global financial crisis. For example, the EU adopted such an approach with 
ESMA’s establishment of a ‘Central Repository (CEREP) for publishing 
rating activity statistics and rating performance statistics of credit rating 
agencies’ (ESMA, 2011). Financial industry professionals such as Persaud 
(2009: 15) likewise welcome ratings-performance approaches, such as a 
‘Gini-coefficient, which measures the ordering of defaults relative to the 
order of ratings.’ 
A valid measurement of rating performance presupposes credit rating 
agencies’ predictions are not able to interact with the social reality ratings 
are trying to predict. Metaphorically speaking, the hit ratio of a 
meteorologist’s predictions is quite a valid proxy for his or her capability, as 
a meteorologist cannot inﬂuence the weather he or she is trying to predict. 
The idea that a transparent evaluation of the credit rating agencies’ track 
record is conducive to rating quality reveals a technical understanding of 
rating as a metric. It neglects the understanding that ratings, as social facts, 
are performative and can shape the social reality they are supposed to 
describe (Hiss and Rona-Tas, 2010: 115-155). Instead of ‘measuring’ credit 
risks like a ‘camera’, ratings also shape them like an ‘engine’ because they 
influence financial market actors’ subsequent decisions (MacKenzie, 2006). 
For instance, if a sovereign rating downgrade leads to increased interest 
rates for a sovereign, its reﬁnancing ability on bond markets deteriorates, 
increasing the probability of a sovereign default even more, amounting to a 
self-fulﬁlling prophecy (Gärtner and Griesbach, 2012). Their pro-cyclical 
character turns ratings into factors of systemic instability (Sy, 2009; 
Paudyn, 2013). This has a straightforward implication for regulation: the 
impact of ratings on investors and issuers invalidates the notion of a 
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supposedly independent measurement of ‘rating performance.’ Applying 
novel regulation techniques which themselves have a blind spot towards 
performativity, shows how the regulatory response has fallen short of initial 
expectations. Regulators have not been able to cope successfully with 
market reflexivity, which confirms the ‘regulators’ conundrum’ according to 
Stellinga and Mügge (2017: 3). 
 
Whether one prefers a higher amount of transparency of the rating 
process or more ‘output-orientation’, such measures have in common an 
understanding of credit rating agencies as neutral, informational 
intermediators between borrowers and lenders who are supposed to 
decrease information asymmetries in financial markets. The underlying 
assumption is that objective knowledge about credit risk pre-exists any 
effort to find such knowledge. The regulators’ task is to make sure credit 
rating agencies can express this unbiased view by silencing the different 
noises generated by conﬂicts of interest or bad practices. The fact that 
rating is judgment with inherent ambiguity remains, even if absolute 
transparency were realized. Regulators and scholars alike should 
acknowledge this characteristic of rating.  
 
Reducing market and regulatory reliance  
Apart from prominent regulatory goals such as increasing competition and 
transparency, in the wake of the global financial crisis attempts were made 
to reduce market and regulatory reliance on CRA ratings to decrease the 
agencies’ authority. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act prescribes the 
removal of references to ratings in ﬁnancial market regulations.5
 
Mandated 
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by the G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) started an initiative to 
reduce reliance on credit rating agencies’ ratings (FSB, 2010). In the case of 
the EU, the Commission ‘supports the view that sole and mechanistic 
reliance on the external credit ratings should be reduced’ (European 
Commission, 2013: 11). However, reducing overreliance should not lead to 
‘legal uncertainty.’ Hence, it adopts a ‘two-step approach:’ It aims to 
remove all references by 2020, while reporting to the European Parliament 
on alternatives to external credit ratings (European Commission, 2013: 11). 
Similarly, in the scholarly literature ‘the withdrawal of rating-based 
regulations’ and the abandonment of the credit rating agencies’ quasi-
regulatory function, are seen as necessary conditions for ‘successful reform 
of the rating industry’ (Darbellay, 2013: 9).  
The rationale behind such initiatives is that reliance on ratings in 
regulatory requirements and investment standards triggers mechanistic 
market responses to rating actions. Especially in crises, rating over-reliance 
can translate into ﬁre sales of securities under downward rating pressure. 
Credit rating agencies’ comments, announcements, outlook changes, and 
actual rating changes, homogenize market participants’ creditworthiness 
perceptions, favour herd behaviour—in the worst case, almost ‘off the cliff 
edge.’ Increasing pro-cyclicality, as mentioned above, means ratings 
become a factor of systemic risk (Sy, 2009; Paudyn, 2013). Consequently, 
the argument suggests, if reliance on credit rating agencies’ ratings in 
regulations is reduced, rating actions will be less consequential, and herd 
behaviour less likely.  
In practice, it has proved very difficult to abandon the hard wiring of 
ratings in regulations and to reduce market reliance. In the case of the US, 
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references were partly replaced in the legislation, however, the SEC is still 
working on the removal of statutory references to credit ratings and on the 
review of reliance on credit ratings, as mandated by Dodd-Frank.6  
More than half a decade since the FSB’s initiative, the prospects of 
success are questionable. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests reliance on 
credit rating agencies persists ‘particularly in private contracts, investment 
mandates, internal limits, and collateral agreements’ (FSB, 2014: 2). When 
the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) presented its Basel IV 
proposals to take ratings out of regulations, market representatives 
opposed them strongly (Verma, 2015).  
If policymakers follow the market’s preference by maintaining external 
ratings in regulatory frameworks, reducing the credit rating agencies’ 
authority to a mere product of regulation does not explain the preference 
(Kennedy, 2008: 68). If the market continues to use external ratings even 
when ratings are entirely removed from regulations, this will, at least 
theoretically, invalidate the regulatory license hypothesis. At the same time, 
it cannot be denied that the outsourcing of credit risk regulation to ratings 
has certainly reinforced the credit rating agencies’ authority and created a 
sort of path-dependency. As Persaud (2009: 15) aptly points out, ‘[i]deally, 
rating agencies should be taken out of bank regulation altogether, but we 
may not be able to put the genie back in the bottle given that ratings will 
still exist.’ This difficulty reveals a remarkable paradox: On the one hand, 
the continued reliance on ratings seems to corroborate the regulatory 
license hypothesis - the credit rating agencies’ authority appears even more 
a product of regulation. On the other hand, the very cause of the credit 
rating agencies’ authority, which is distinct from the regulatory use of 
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ratings, prevents a reduced reliance on ratings and is keeping the regulatory 
license hypothesis alive.  
Path-dependency aside, an aspect often neglected by advocates of the 
regulatory license hypothesis is that market practice of rating use preceded 
the reliance on ratings by national regulators, supervisors, and central 
banks. For example, the Bank for International Settlements legitimized 
regulatory reliance on ratings in the Basel II framework with ‘market 
practice’ given that ‘financial institutions and market players [...] already 
used external credit ratings extensively in their risk management processes’ 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009: 55). Likewise, although 
the Reform Act increased the number of NRSROs registered with the SEC 
with ‘licensing power’ from three to ten, the market oligopoly has continued 
to exist.7   
Another explanation for the FSB’s lack of success concerns the practical 
difficulty of replacing ratings. This is not to say there are no viable 
alternatives.8
 
Incentivizing the use of alternatives to CRA ratings, including 
the promotion of investors’ due diligence, however, disregards the rationale 
behind the use of ratings in disintermediated ﬁnancial markets. The 
disappearance of the traditional role of banks in ﬁnancial intermediation 
and related developments such as securitisation and the trade-ability of 
credit risk necessitate judgmental intermediation between those having and 
those seeking funds.
 
This is not apologetic about the status quo − quite the 
contrary. Effective credit rating agency regulation aimed at changing the 
status quo cannot circumvent these constitutive features of rating in 
disintermediated ﬁnancial markets. 9  
If the root of the credit rating agencies’ authority lies somewhere else 
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than in its regulatory license—whether in reputational ‘ﬁrst mover’ 
advantages or other structural features of disintermediated ﬁnance—then a 
successful reduction of the regulatory reliance on ratings, even if practically 
feasible, will not be a sufficient measure to end the credit rating agencies’ 
authority. 
  
Non-events of reform 
If an erroneous understanding of rating contributed to ineffective 
regulation, it also prevented other regulation more likely to keep a check on 
the agencies’ authority from emerging. In the following, we discuss three 
examples of such non-events: the persistence of rating analytics, the 
dominant business model, and the missed opportunity to establish a public 
credit rating agency. 
 
Persistence of rating analytics  
Conceiving the assessment of creditworthiness as a calculation of the 
probability of default which exists ‘out there’ – exogenously, based on a 
normal distribution − credit rating agencies can be construed as neutral 
information intermediators and their task becomes ‘discovering’ this rating. 
The appearance of rating as a purely technical exercise nurtures a 
misunderstanding of ratings as metrics that goes beyond interpretation, 
undermining the regulators’ confidence in interfering with rating analytics 
and methodologies.  
Admittedly, the rating format has played a part in this 
misunderstanding insofar as it facilitates the contradiction between the 
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credit rating agencies’ assertion that ratings are opinions and their 
simultaneous attempt ‘to objectify and offer their views as facts’ (Sinclair, 
2005: 46). Instead of using cumbersome text, which would fit better with 
the legal deﬁnition of rating as a qualitative opinion, the easy-to-
understand letter grade symbol (‘AAA,’ ‘B’ or ‘C’) suggests ratings are 
unambiguous data. Thanks to their ‘distinctively portable format and 
scientiﬁc appearance’, ratings invoke the authority of quantified and 
calculated knowledge (Carruthers, 2013: 544). This purely perceptual 
association with scientiﬁc method, paradoxically, exempts the agencies 
from the need to prove their objectivity. They can even afford to deny 
aspirations to objectivity and relativize their product as opinion without 
losing credibility (which is, by the way, quite convenient in fending off 
liability claims), while claiming authorship of the ‘common language of 
risk.’ 
It is tempting to blame the CRAs for deception, but this is too simplistic. 
The widespread misunderstanding of ratings as metrics is not the result of 
dubious corporate practices, but deeply rooted in market adoption of 
heuristics, rules of thumb, and other devices to guide decisions in the face 
of ‘pervasive uncertainty’ (Abdelal, 2009: 73). The letter grade symbol 
creates an optical illusion of ‘ostensible precision’ as it condenses the 
‘highly complex contingencies of credit risk’ into a ‘single measure’ (Kerwer, 
2002: 43). Buying into the positivist assumption that the future is 
knowable, an understanding of ratings as metrics conveys the impression of 
acting premised on measured probabilities, and thus exercising control 
over an uncertain future (Porter, 2010: 56). The perceived value CRAs offer 
as transformers of ‘uncertainty into calculable risk’ thus hinges on the 
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epistemological fallacy that calculation can domesticate uncertainty 
(Kerwer, 2002: 43).  
Questions of to what extent CRAs really employ calculation techniques 
to form their judgments, or to what extent uncertainty is de facto absorbed, 
are indeed irrelevant in this context (Abdelal and Bruner, 2005: 211). 
Rather, conceiving of ratings as metrics suggests ratings can turn 
uncertainty into something manageable and tangible, and, most 
importantly, to give a name to credit risk. Therefore, in order to uphold the 
‘stability that makes political and economic transactions possible,’ it is in 
the market participants’ and regulators’ interest that the ‘veil of highly 
technical analysis’ around rating is preserved (Katzenstein and Nelson, 
2013: 1117), and, thus, that the misunderstanding of rating as a metric is 
perpetuated. The tacit agreement to overlook the tension between signiﬁer 
(rating symbol) and signiﬁcant (opinion) helps investors navigate through 
the complexity of today’s ﬁnancial markets.
 
Providing orientation by 
creating predictability trumps the dangers of wishful thinking. The ‘value 
[credit rating agencies] are thought to offer seems to shield them from 
authority decay’ (Sinclair, 2005: 173). While investors regard the credit 
rating agencies’ analytical basis as reliable (Strulik, 2002), ratings reduce 
felt uncertainty. If regulators reaffirm the validity of rating analytics by not 
interfering with them, the credit rating agencies’ epistemic authority 
remains intact.  
However, one cannot deny that in the immediate wake of the crisis, 
policymakers expressed the intent to interfere with the ‘production’ of 
ratings. In the case of the EU, Quaglia (2013: 61) maintains that CRAs 
successfully lobbied against ‘the most onerous parts of the proposed 
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legislation, such as the requirements that regulators should gather 
information about the model used by credit rating agencies.’ Stellinga and 
Mügge (2017: 13) question such an account since ‘this overlooks that EU 
regulators and supervisors themselves had from the start been deeply 
sceptical of vetting rating methodologies, let alone determining 
methodologies themselves.’  
 Similarly, rating analytics have remained unaffected by the Dodd-Frank 
Act in the US. The ‘Limitation Clause’ of the Credit Rating Agencies Reform 
Act of 2006, which prevents a substantive intervention by regulators into 
rating methodologies, is still alive. It can be found in the SEC’s Final Rules 
on credit rating agency reform mandated by Dodd-Frank:10  
 
neither the Commission nor any State (or political subdivision thereof) 
may regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and 
methodologies by which any NRSRO determines credit ratings.11 
 
(Un)surprisingly, the history of this clause can be traced back to the 
successful lobbying by CRAs in the lead up to the Reform Act of 2006 
(Langohr and Langohr, 2008: 453-454). 
 
 
We cannot test the counterfactual scenario of how regulatory 
interference into rating analytics would have looked if CRAs’ lobbying 
efforts in the EU or the US had been ineffective. For this scenario to come 
into existence it would have necessitated an acknowledgement of the 
structural dimension of the CRAs’ authority. By implication, such an 
understanding would have instead been able to anticipate and counteract 
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the agencies’ lobbying efforts.12 Taking into account the regulators’ doubt in 
their ability to improve rating quality through substantive involvement in 
rating analytics, it is, however, highly questionable whether regulators 
would have dared deconstruct the technical aura of ratings and resolve the 
dominant misunderstanding of ratings as metrics (Stellinga and Mügge, 
2017: 13).  
It may appear then only consistent that regulators have not interfered 
with the analytics themselves, but, as is the case with the EU, with the 
timing of sovereign ratings.13 True to the motto of ‘not doing what you 
should, but what you can,’ the new EU regulations attempt to limit the 
frequency of unsolicited sovereign ratings ‘to three per year’ (European 
Commission, 2013: 5). ‘To avoid market disruption,’ rating agencies are 
required to ‘set up a calendar indicating when they will rate Member 
States.’ Furthermore, the timing of the publication is regulated, allowing 
agencies to publish ratings only on ‘Fridays after close of business and at 
least one hour before the opening of trading venues in the EU’ (European 
Commission, 2013: 5). At the same time, reviews of sovereign ratings must 
occur ‘at least every six months.’ These regulatory steps reveal that 
regulators put a serious effort into making rating actions more predictable.  
As much as it may seem a welcoming move to counteract the pro-
cyclicality of ratings by imposing caps on the frequency of ratings, it is a 
regulatory answer that stems from a specific context. During the European 
sovereign debt crisis, the CRAs’ sovereign rating hyperactivity exacerbated 
the market’s perception of sovereign credit risk (Gaillard, 2014; Gaillard, 
2012). The volatility of sovereign ratings was construed as a lack of quality, 
which necessitated regulatory intervention. The irony is that previous 
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criticisms of the agencies, as, for example, in the case of the Enron debacle, 
went in the exact opposite direction; ratings at the time were not deemed 
timely enough. Demands for ‘speeding up’ the rating process and the 
processing of information were the order of the day (Sinclair, 2005: 169). 
This shows there may be no ‘one-size-fits all’ solution when it comes to the 
ideal degree of rating volatility, which varies according to time and context. 
Furthermore, apart from sovereign ratings, other rating types may greatly 
differ in terms of their ‘default’ volatility, such as corporate and municipal 
ratings versus mortgage-backed security (MBS) ratings, making it even 
more difficult to decide when regulatory intervention is required.  
Whether it is a decrease or increase in the agencies’ activism regulators 
aim to address with their policies, the underlying understanding of rating 
as a technical and predictable exercise prevails in the regulatory goal to 
limit rating volatility, whereas, understanding rating as reasoned 
judgement falls by the wayside.  
 
Persistence of the traditional business model  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the ‘issuer-pays’ system replaced the 
‘investor-pays’ business model as the predominant remuneration model in 
the rating industry (Marandola and Sinclair, 2017: 479). Its inherent 
conﬂicts of interest were widely blamed for the overly optimistic ratings of 
structured ﬁnancial products that became ‘toxic assets’ at the peak of the 
global financial crisis (Sinclair, 2010; White, 2010; Partnoy, 2010). Despite 
this consensus ‘[t]here has been little change in the use of remuneration 
models since the implementation of the [new] credit rating agencies 
regulation’ (European Commission, 2016: 7; Mattarocci, 2014: 74).
 
‘Issuer-
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pays’ has remained the dominant business model.  
According to Gaillard and Harrington (2016: 38), issuer-pays and its 
conﬂicts of interest would disappear if credit rating agencies were subjected 
‘to expert liability as expressed in the plain language of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.’ CRAs would be ‘considered part of a registration statement prepared 
or certified by an expert,’ putting them on the same level as other 
‘gatekeepers,’ such as auditors.14  
In the meantime, however, putting an end to the liability exemption 
regime is getting more and more out of reach. The Financial CHOICE Act of 
2017, also informally known as the ‘dismantling of Dodd-Frank,’ trimmed 
the SEC’s ‘to do’ list in this respect.15 We note that de facto, regulatory 
authorities continued to exempt credit rating agencies from expert liability 
even before the Trump presidency. The effort to repeal SEC Rule 436(g) 
proved a futile undertaking in Dodd-Frank. Shortly after the Dodd-Frank 
provision took effect in the summer 2010, CRAs were unwilling to give their 
consent to issuers to use their ratings in prospectuses or debt registration 
statements (Marandola and Sinclair, 2017: 490). Taking the heat, the SEC 
issued a No-Action letter on 23 November 2010 stating that ‘no 
enforcement action will be recommended if an asset-backed issuer omits a 
rating disclosure newly required (…) and cites as the rationale the 
unwillingness of NRSROs to provide consent to being named as experts’ 
(Gaillard and Harrington, 2016: 47).16 The credit rating agencies’ successful 
threat to boycott proved effective in fending off liability and preserving 
their status as opinion issuing entities, protected by First Amendment 
rights under the U.S. Constitution. As in the case of rating analytics, an 
understanding of the CRAs that encompassed the structural dimension of 
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their authority would have likely been able to pre-empt the agencies’ threat 
of boycott. 
Going beyond aspects of liability and issuer-pays, there is, however, a 
more fundamental explanation for the persistence of the rating business 
model. Alternatives to issuer-pays entail other conﬂicts of interest, for 
example, the ‘investor-pays’ business model is susceptible to free-riding 
due to the public good character of rating (Coffee, 2011). Indeed, the switch 
to issuer-pays in the 1970s occurred because of the ‘advent of copying 
machines’ (Rivlin and Soroushian, 2017). As Persaud (2009: 15) puts it,  
[i]n today’s information-free, equal-disclosure world, the value 
of a rating is that everyone knows it. But if everybody already 
knows it they will not pay for it. 
 
The resulting trade-off between proﬁtability, transparency and rating 
quality produces conﬂicts of interest regardless of the business model. 
Regulators, however, have been unwilling to address these basic tensions 
arising from the commodiﬁcation of rating. Sticking to the commodiﬁcation 
of rating in its present form, regulators indirectly approve the business 
model that prevailed for the last five decades. Abandoning the 
commodiﬁcation of rating would mean a drastic change with unknown 
adjustment costs that may deter regulators, notwithstanding the ‘rating 
failures’ of the past.17  
The understanding of credit rating agencies as neutral informational 
intermediators encourages an unproblematic view of the commodiﬁcation 
of rating. This understanding emerges from the historical process of 
ﬁnancial disintermediation that enhanced the demand for information 
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about credit risk (Sinclair, 1999: 154). Becoming ‘active market 
participants’ themselves, banks gradually delegated their traditional task of 
due diligence to a third party (Abdelal and Bruner, 2005: 196). The credit 
rating agencies provided an efficient solution to intermediate between 
lenders with funds and borrowers seeking them ‘because of the economies 
of specialization inherent in rating and the clearly disinterested nature of 
analysis’ (Sinclair, 1999:  155). As those seeking funds have an incentive to 
downplay ﬁnancial risks, and those with funds have an incentive to over-
estimate the ﬁnancial risks of investment possibilities, an ‘independent’ 
third-party opinion can minimize the distorted perceptions. From such a 
perspective, a credit rating agency assumes the key role as ‘neutral 
information provider’ (Kerwer, 2002: 43).  
An exclusive focus on the role of credit rating agencies in 
disintermediated ﬁnancial markets contributes, ﬁrst, to an isolated 
understanding of credit rating agencies as neutral informational 
intermediaries whose function is to decrease information asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders, and, second, to a neglect of the unintended 
consequences accompanying the commodiﬁcation of rating.  
 
Calls for a public Credit Rating Agency go unheard  
The series of rating debacles over the last two decades went hand in hand 
with growing calls for the establishment of a ‘public’ credit rating agency, 
which, for example, could be run by the UN (Guardian, 2012), or the IMF. 
In the years preceding the global financial crisis, plans to establish a 
European CRA enjoyed a ‘groundswell of support’ in the financial 
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community and amongst politicians on the Continent (Engelen, 2004: 64). 
Nevertheless, rivalling the dominance of the American agencies has proved 
to be impossible. In the wake of crisis, former European Commissioner for 
Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier, and policymakers from 
different parts of the ideological spectrum, again, pushed for the set-up of 
‘an own,’ European CRA (Spiegel, 2011; Welt 2011).18 However, the 
initiative did not bear fruit. Similarly, emerging economies have tried to 
come up with an alternative to the Big Three, but the prospects for building 
up a rating agency of comparable authoritative standing remain uncertain 
as of this writing (Mennillo, forthcoming; Helleiner and Wang, 2018). 
Often, attempts have been tripped up by technicalities, such as, for 
instance, the business model, or ‘logistical’ reasons as in the case of the 
initiative by the European Commission and the Munich-based consulting 
firm ‘Roland Berger’ (Abdelal and Blyth, 2015: 57-58).19 
Further reasons the establishment of a public CRA has remained 
elusive, include potential ‘concerns regarding the [European] CRA’s 
credibility especially if a publicly funded CRA would rate the Member 
States which finance the CRA,’ and the simultaneous alleged concern about 
putting ‘private CRAs at a comparative disadvantage’ (European 
Commission, 2013: 9). However, a non-credible CRA will hardly be able to 
distort competition since recognition by market participants and reputation 
are the sine qua non of the chances of survival of any rating agency. 
Moreover, competitive dynamics are largely absent in the rating market 
considering the persistent oligopolistic market structure. Therefore, there is 
not a lot of room to distort in the first place. 
The tacit unwillingness to acknowledge the actual nature of rating as 
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a ‘public good’, given its de facto non-excludability and non-rivalry in 
consumption, account for the non-event of establishing a public rating 
agency (Bruner and Abdelal, 2005: 195). The implicit assumption private 
companies are supposed to handle the ‘production’ of ratings thwarts the 
attempt to set up a public rating institution a priori.20 Such entrenched 
beliefs do not appear out of nowhere. For example, mainstream economists 
tend to discard the idea of a public or European credit rating agency hinting 
at the lack of government independence such an institution would 
automatically suffer. Political dependence would inevitably translate into 
lower rating quality (Bartels and Weder di Mauro, 2013). Put differently, 
from a traditional economics’ perspective the damage to expect from 
mistaking an actual public good for a private good seems to be lower than 
having a public institution providing that same good; government aversion 
trumps the risks of centralized market authority and the potential for 
abuse. Consequently, a commodiﬁcation of rating as if it was a private good 
is seen as largely unproblematic. 
In fact, the insinuated lack of independence of public CRAs cannot 
be easily dismissed, especially in terms of sovereign ratings. At the same 
time, private agencies have not been devoid of failure in this respect, as 
elaborated above. To mitigate the effect of ‘home bias,’ Fuchs and Gehring 
(2017: 1419) suggest regulation should enhance a plurality of sovereign 
ratings to be considered by investors, ‘ideally from different countries and 
cultural backgrounds.’ A new, public CRA might even be prohibited from 
issuing sovereign ratings at least for the first years of operation in order to 
accumulate credibility. The Big Three also started to engage in sovereign 
ratings as a complimentary service to investors only in the 1980s.21   
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Beyond ideological considerations there are, again, practical 
considerations that explain why a public credit rating agency may not be a 
viable solution. One consideration, for example, concerns operational cost-
efficiency, given the CRAs’ experience, expertise, and reputation – whether 
deserved or not – accumulated over the last century. Despite all objections 
of a practical nature, however, ideological predilections have played a 
pivotal role in acting as a break on the establishment of a public CRA. As is 
often the case with the power of ideas and commonly shared cognitive 
constructions, these are not necessarily consequential because of the 
validity of their content (Abdelal et al., 2010: 11; Roy et al., 2007; Denzau 
and North, 1994). If market participants take it for granted that a public 
institution lacks independence and credibility, this will be detrimental to 
perceived rating quality – dealing a deathblow to any emergent public CRA. 
 
Conclusion 
Credit rating agencies used the global financial crisis to their advantage 
instead of experiencing an irreversible damage to their reputation, as one 
would expect. They succeeded in retaining their epistemic authority even 
after an existential crisis. This article illustrates how the approach to 
regulating the CRAs has been complicit in the puzzling survival of the 
agencies.  
Analysing credit rating agency regulations in the US, the 
transnational level, and the EU after the global financial crisis, we find that 
the scope and intensity of regulation has increased, to the cost of the credit 
rating agencies, those who use their services, and the taxpayer who ﬁnances 
the regulatory authorities in charge. What has not changed compared to the 
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pre-crisis years is the dominant understanding of rating underlying the 
regulatory goals. We show how treating ratings as unambiguous and 
fungible metrics, private goods, and independent and neutral third-party 
opinions, has led to failed efforts to regulate the credit rating agencies 
industry. Even though policymakers have tried to fix the ‘wrongs,’ they have 
only scratched the surface and got carried away mainly by treating the 
symptoms. The regulators’ unwillingness to interfere with rating analytics, 
solve the conﬂicts of interest inherent in the issuer-pays business model, 
and establish a public credit rating agency despite lip service to that idea, 
indicates a reluctance to address the roots of the problem.  
Ratings are not material facts ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered. 
Rating agencies create ratings; they are social constructions that provide 
one possible, centralized interpretation of creditworthiness. Since the 
market accepts these ratings because it sees certain credit rating agencies as 
authoritative (and others as not), ratings become social facts − a commonly 
shared interpretation of creditworthiness. Rather than regulate rating 
practices, as if this mattered as a technical process, we need to focus 
regulation on the systemically risky character of the agencies. This implies a 
treatment of rating as judgement, authoritative opinion, public good and 
constitutive feature of disintermediated financial markets, which 
presupposes policymakers, practitioners, and the scholarly community are 
willing to reject the hitherto dominant understanding of rating. Otherwise, 
rating, regulatory failure, and the credit rating agencies’ authority will 
remain a never-ending story. 
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Notes 
 
1 See the discussion of Mervyn Kings’ ‘The End of Alchemy’ by Michael Lewis, ‘The book that 
will save banking from itself,’ Bloomberg Businessweek, 9 May – 15 May 2016: 12–15. 
 
2  For example, see recital 42 and Section E, Annex 1, Transparency Report, par. 3 in 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 on credit rating agencies.   
3 Economists tend to label self-fulfilling outcomes of pessimism or optimism as ‘multiple 
equilibria’ (Blanchard, 2011). 
 
4 Likewise, Ferri et al. (1999) detect procyclicality in pre-crisis ratings; the agencies would 
have assigned too favorable ratings compared to economic fundamentals. 
Consequently, CRAs failed to predict the emergence of the East Asian Crisis and ‘may 
have helped to exacerbate the boom and bust cycle’ (Ferri et al., 1999: 353). 
 
5  See Sec 939–939A in United States Congress, ‘Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act’, Public Law 111-203, 111th Congress, H.R. 4173, 21 July 2010. 
6 See Section 939 and 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act. For the status of the adoption of 
provisions, see SEC website: https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank-
section.shtml#939; https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank-section.shtml#939A 
(accessed 13 December 2018). 
 
7 Source: SEC website, https://www.sec.gov/ocr/ocr-current-nrsros.html (accessed 4 
September 2017). 
 
8 Alternatives to CRAs’ ratings are, for example, internal ratings of ﬁnancial institutions, 
market implied ratings, accountancy-based measures, OECD country risk classiﬁcation 
(for sovereign ratings), or Central Credit Registers (for corporates). For further details, 
see European Commission (2015) Study on the Feasibility of Alternatives to Credit 
Ratings, Executive Summary: 4-6. 
9 Financial disintermediation is typically associated with the replacement of the banks’ 
‘buy-and-hold’ business model by ‘originate-and-distribute.’ 
 
10 See Section 932 on the ‘Enhanced Regulation, Accountability, and Transparency of 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,’ Title IX, Subsection C, Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, HR 4173, 111th Congress, 2nd 
Session (2010). The SEC’s final rules make amendments and add new subsections to 
Rule 17g under the Exchange Act (as well as Rule 15-Ga). 
 
11 See section 15 E(c)(2) of the Exchange Act. The Reform Act (2006) added Section 15E  
(‘Registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’) to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The latter is usually abbreviated as the ‘Exchange Act’. 
Apart from minor changes, the Dodd-Frank Act draws on the CRA Reform Act of 2006 
to regulate the CRAs in the aftermath of the crisis (Hiss and Nagel, 2014: 134). 
 
12 The same logic applies to the successful CRAs’ threat to boycott in the case of the liability 
provisions. 
 
13 See L 146/9, par. 42, European Parliament and the Council (2013) Regulation (EU) No 
462/2013, amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. 21 May 
2013. 
 
14 For the planned repeal of the SEC Rule 436(g), see Dodd-Frank Section 939G. The SEC 
Rule 436(g), i.e. the 1982 amendment to Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 
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provides the legal foundation for the ‘exemption regime,’ see also Gaillard and 
Harrington (2016): 40.  
 
15 The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (Section 853) aims to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act 
Nullification of the SEC Rule 436(g). The bill passed the House of Representatives on 8 
June 2017, but has not yet passed the Senate. In the meantime, President Trump signed 
‘The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act’ (the ‘Reform 
Law’) on 24 May 2018. It contains only fractions of the Financial Choice Act, and does 
not include provisions regarding CRAs. 
 
16 Another attempt to undo the repeal of section 939G of Dodd-Frank and to restore 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 436(g) was the ‘Asset-Backed Market 
Stabilization Act.’ It was introduced on 20 July 2011, but was not enacted. 
 
17  Known alternatives to rating commodiﬁcation are third party assessments ‘by non-
commercial entities such as the OECD Country Risk Classiﬁcations and central databases 
owned or managed by Central Banks,’ see European Commission (2015) Study on the 
Feasibility of Alternatives to Credit Ratings, Executive Summary: 5. Further examples 
are decentralized rating platforms such as ‘Wikirating’ 
(http://www.wikirating.org/wiki/Wikirating:About, accessed 14 May 2018). 
18 Against the backdrop of the CRAs’ excessive downgrading of sovereign debt issued by 
Eurozone countries in the aftermath of the GFC, such calls were dismissed as 
retaliatory tactics by European policymakers, see, for example, Bartels and Weder di 
Mauro (2013).  
 
19 The European Commission estimated the cost of setting-up a public CRA around 300-
500 million Euro over a period of five years (European Commission, 2013: 9). 
 
20 The apparent lack of sufficient ideational support not only by regulators, but also by 
large parts of the financial industry, may have tipped the balance in favor of the status 
quo (Spiegel, 2011). 
 
21 A more disruptive solution to the sovereign rating problematique, which hinders the set-
up of a  
European public CRA, would be that the ECB becomes the ‘epistemic authority’ in 
terms of creditworthiness. This means it would not rely on independent third-party 
opinions to guarantee the creditworthiness of its ‘sovereign’ (euro area as a whole), but 
would do so in its own capacity as central bank, ‘state fiat’ (as in the case of the Fed). 
To what extent this is practically and politically feasible, considering the political 
integration this would require in the EU, is a different story.   
 
 
 
References 
 
Abdelal R and Blyth M (2015) Just Who Put You in Charge? We Did: Credit 
Rating Agencies and the Politics of Ratings. In: Cooley A and Snyder J 
(eds) Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global 
Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 39–59. 
Abdelal R, Blyth M and Parsons C (2010) Constructing the International 
Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Abdelal R (2009) Constructivism as an Approach to International Political 
Economy. In: Blyth M (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International 
Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a global conversation. London: 
Routledge: 62–76. 
 
35 
                                                                                                                                       
Amtenbrink F and De Haan J (2011) Credit Rating Agencies. Netherlands 
Central Bank, Research Department, DNB Working Papers, No. 278. 
Amtenbrink F and Heine K (2013) Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in the 
European Union: Lessons from Behavioural Science, The Dovenschmidt 
Quarterly 2(1): 2–15. 
 
Barducci MC and Fest T (2011) Evaluation of the Regulations of Credit 
Rating Agencies in the United States and the European Community. 
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
id=1803132 (accessed 29 August 2016). 
Barta Z and Johnston A (2018) Rating Politics? Partisan Discrimination in 
Credit Ratings in Developed Economies. Comparative Political Studies 
51(5): 587-620. 
 
Bartels B and Weder di Mauro B (2013) A rating agency for Europe–A good 
idea? VOX, CEPR’s policy portal. Available at: 
https://voxeu.org/article/rating-agency-europe-good-idea (accessed 15 
May 2018). 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), ‘Strengthening the 
Resilience of the Banking Sector: Consultative Document.’ December 
2009, Bank for International Settlements. 
 
Batchelor V and Nicholas K (2013) Moody’s Alters Sovereign Rating Method 
to Better Assess Risk. Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-13/moodys-revises-
sovereign-rating-method-to-better-assess-risk (accessed 21 July 2015). 
Blanchard O (2011) 2011 In Review: Four Hard Truths. Available at:  
https://blogs.imf.org/2011/12/21/2011-in-review-four-hard-truths/ 
(accessed 26 November 2018). 
 
Blodget H (2011) Moody’s Analyst Breaks Silence: Says Ratings Agency 
Rotten To Core With Conﬂicts. Available at: 
https://www.businessinsider.com/moodys-analyst-conflicts-corruption-
and-greed-2011-8/?IR=T (accessed 1 February 2015). 
Brummer C and Loko R (2014) The New Politics of Transatlantic Credit 
Rating Agency 
Regulation. In: Porter T (ed) Transnational Financial Regulation After 
the Crisis. London and New York: Routledge, 154–176. 
 
Bruner C and Abdelal R (2005) To Judge Leviathan: Sovereign Credit 
Ratings, National Law, and the World Economy. Journal of Public Policy 
25(2): 191–217. 
Brunnermeier M, Crocket A, Goodhart C et al. (2009) The Fundamental 
Principles of Financial Regulation, Geneva Reports on the World 
Economy, International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies. 
 
 
36 
                                                                                                                                       
Carruthers BG (2013) From uncertainty toward risk: the case of credit 
ratings. Socio-Economic Review 11(3): 525–551. 
Coffee Jr (2011) Ratings reform: The good, the bad, and the ugly. Harvard 
Business Law Review 1: 231–278. 
 
Darbellay A (2013) Regulating credit rating agencies. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
Denzau AT and North DC (1994) Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and 
Institutions. 
Kyklos 47(1): 3–31. 
 
Engelen KC (2004) Das empire strikes back. The International Economy 
18(1): 64–71. 
 
European Commission (2016) Study on the State of the Credit Rating 
Market: Final Report— Executive Summary. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/state-of-credit-rating-market-
study-01012016_en.pdf (accessed 21 March 2018). 
 
European Commission (2015) Study on the Feasibility of Alternatives to 
Credit Ratings: 
Executive Summary. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/alternatives-to-credit-rating-
study-01122015_en.pdf (accessed 21 March 2018). 
 
European Commission (2013) New rules on credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
enter into force – frequently asked questions. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-571_en.htm (accessed 
21 March 2018). 
 
European Parliament and the Council (2013) Regulation (EU) No 
462/2013, amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies. 21 May 2013. 
 
European Securities and Markets Authority (2011) About the CEREP, 
ESMA/2011/408. 
Ferri G, Liu L and Stiglitz JE (1999) The Procyclical Role of Rating 
Agencies: Evidence from the East Asian Crisis. Economic Notes 28(3): 
335-355.  
Financial Stability Board (2014) Thematic Review on FSB Principles for 
Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings, Peer Review Report. 
Financial Stability Board (2010) Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA 
Ratings. 
Fuchs A and Gehring K (2017) The Home Bias in Sovereign Ratings. 
Journal of the European Economic Association 15(6): 1386-1423.  
Gaillard NJ and Harrington WJ (2016) Efficient, Commonsense Actions to 
 
37 
                                                                                                                                       
Foster Accurate Credit Ratings. Capital Markets Law Journal 11(1): 38–
59. 
Gaillard N (2014) How and why credit rating agencies missed the eurozone 
debt crisis. Capital Markets Law Journal 9(2), 121–136. 
 
Gaillard N (2012) A Century of Sovereign Ratings. Springer Verlag. 
 
Gärtner M and Griesbach B (2012) Rating agencies, self-fulfilling prophecy 
and multiple equilibria? An empirical model of the European sovereign 
debt crisis 2009-2011, Economics Working Paper Series, No. 1215. 
University of St.Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science. 
 
Gärtner M, Griesbach B and Jung F (2011) PIGS or Lambs? The European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies. International 
Advances in Economic Research 17(3): 288–299. 
 
Guardian (2012) Time to take control of the credit rating agencies, by 
Chakrabortty A, 16 January 2012. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/16/time-
control-credit-ratings-agencies (accessed 15 May 2018). 
 
Helleiner E and Wang H (2018) Limits to the BRICS' challenge: credit 
rating reform and institutional innovation in global finance. Review of 
International Political Economy 25(5): 573-595. 
 
Hiss S and Nagel S (2014) Credit Rating Agencies. In: Mügge D (ed) Europe 
and the Governance of Global Finance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
127–140. 
 
Hiss S and Rona-Tas A (2010) The role of ratings in the subprime mortgage 
crisis: The art of corporate and the science of consumer credit rating. In: 
Markets on trial: the economic sociology of the US ﬁnancial crisis. 
Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 115–155. 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (2015) IOSCO Issues 
Final Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies. 
Available at: https://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS375.pdf 
(accessed 30 July 2015). 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (2004) Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies. Available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf (accessed 
21 March 2018). 
Katzenstein PJ and Nelson SC (2013) Reading the right signals and reading 
the signals right: IPE and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. Review of 
International Political Economy 20 (5): 1101–31. 
Kennedy S (2008) China's emerging credit rating industry: The official 
foundations of private authority. The China Quarterly. 193(193): 65-83. 
 
 
38 
                                                                                                                                       
Kerwer D (2002) Rating agencies setting a standard for global ﬁnancial 
markets. Economic Sociology: European Electronic Newsletter 3(3): 1–
6. 
Kessler O (2016) The failure of failure: on constructivism, the limits of 
critique, and the socio-political economy of economics. Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 44(3): 348–369. 
Kiff J, Nowak S and Schumacher LB (2012) Are Rating Agencies Powerful? 
An Investigation Into the Impact and Accuracy of Sovereign Ratings. IMF 
Working Papers 12/23.  
Kruck A (2016) Resilient blunderers: credit rating ﬁascos and rating 
agencies’ institutionalized status as private authorities. Journal of 
European Public Policy 23(5): 753–770. 
Langohr H. and Langohr P (2008) The rating agencies and their credit 
ratings: what they are, how they work, and why they are relevant. 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Lewis M (2016) The Book That Will Save Banking From Itself. Bloomberg 
Businessweek, 9 
May – 15 May 2016: 12–15, Available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-05-05/the-book-that-
will-save-banking-from-itself (accessed 21 March 2018).  
 
MacKenzie D (2006) An Engine, Not a Camera. Cambridge: The MIT 
Press. 
 
Marandola G and Sinclair TJ (2017) Credit rating agencies are poorly 
understood and  
the rules developed for them will not work. In Pollard J and Martin R 
(eds) Handbook on the Geographies of Money and Finance. London, 
Edward Elgar: 478–498. 
 
Mattarocci G (2014) The Independence of Credit Rating Agencies: How 
Business Models and Regulators Interact. Oxford: Elsevier Academic 
Press. 
McVea H (2010) Regulating credit rating agencies in the European Union: 
where might it lead?. Amicus Curiae 83: 2–6. 
Mennillo G (forthcoming) He who pays the piper calls the tune: And the 
‘relocation of the world’s credit rating center’ goes to? In: Kim SY (ed) 
BRICS and the Global Economy. Singapore: World Scientific.  
Ouroussoff A (2010) Wall Street at war: The secret struggle for the global 
economy. Cambridge, U.K; Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
Partnoy F (2006) How and why credit rating agencies are not like other 
gatekeepers. In: Fuchita Y and Litan RE (eds) Financial Gatekeepers: 
Can They Protect Investors? Brookings Institution Press: 59–99. 
 
39 
                                                                                                                                       
Partnoy F (2010) Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause 
of the Crisis. Eleventh Annual International Banking Conference of The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the European Central Bank. 
 
Paudyn B (2013) Credit rating agencies and the sovereign debt crisis: 
performing 
the politics of creditworthiness through risk and uncertainty, Review of 
International Political Economy 20(4): 788–818. 
 
Persaud A (2009) What to do about Credit Rating Agencies’? Macro-
Prudential and Micro-Prudential Regulation. In Praise of Unlevel 
Playing Fields, Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform. 
Coventry: The University of Warwick. 
Porter T (2010) Risk models and transnational governance in the global 
ﬁnancial crisis: the cases of Basel II and credit rating agencies. In: 
Helleiner E, Pagliari S and Zimmermann H (eds) Global Finance in 
Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change. London, 
Routledge: 56–73. 
Quaglia L (2013) Financial services governance in the European Union 
after the global 
ﬁnancial crisis: incremental changes or path-breaking reform? In: 
Moschella M and Tsingou E (eds) Great expectations, slow 
transformations: incremental change in post-crisis regulation. 
Colchester, ECPR Press: 57–75. 
 
Roy RK, Denzau A and Willett TD (2006) Neoliberalism: national and 
regional experiments with global ideas. London, New York: Routledge.  
 
Roubini R (2015) Rating agencies still matter – and that is inexcusable. 
Financial Times, 10 August 2015. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)- Current NRSROs. Available 
at: https://www.sec.gov/ocr/ocr-current-nrsros.html (accessed 4 
September 2017). 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Final Rule: Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations Release 34-72936 (Aug. 27, 
2014). https://www.sec.gov/ocr/ocr-nrsro-rules.html (accessed 13 
December 2018). 
Sinclair TJ (2013) Global ﬁnancial crises. In: Beeson M and Bisley N (eds) 
Issues in 21st century world politics – Second edition. Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK: 80–91.  
Sinclair TJ (2010) Round up the usual suspects: Blame and the subprime 
crisis. New Political Economy 15(1): 91–107. 
Sinclair TJ (2005) The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating 
Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
40 
                                                                                                                                       
Sinclair TJ (1999) Bond-rating agencies and coordination in the global 
political economy. In: Cutler AC, Hauﬂer V and Porter T (eds) Private 
Authority and International Aﬀairs. Albany, State University of New York 
Press: 153–167. 
Soroushian JB and Rivlin AM (2017) Credit rating agency reform is 
incomplete. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/credit-
rating-agency-reform-is-incomplete/ (accessed 21 March 2018).  
Spiegel (2011) Breaking the Power of the 'Big Three': German Firm Wants 
to Set Up New Rating Agency by Müller P, Sauga M and Schult C, 11 July 
2011. Available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/breaking-the-power-of-the-
big-three-german-firm-wants-to-set-up-new-rating-agency-a-
773549.html (accessed 15 May 2018). 
Stellinga B and Mügge D (2017) The regulator’s conundrum. How market 
reflexivity limits 
fundamental financial reform. Review of International Political 
Economy 24(3): 393–423. 
 
Strulik T (2002) Rating agencies and systemic risk. In: Heritier A (ed) 
Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littleﬁeld: 317–335.  
Sy A (2009) The systemic regulation of credit rating agencies and rated 
markets,  
IMF Working Papers, 09/129, Washington, DC: IMF. 
 
United States Congress (2006), ‘Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006’. 
Public Law 109-291, 109th Congress, S. 3850, 29 September 2006. 
 
United States Congress (2010), ‘Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act’. Public Law 111-203, 111th Congress, H.R. 
4173, 21 July 2010. 
 
Verma S (2015) Bank regulation: ‘Basel IV’ sparks banker fury. March, 
London: Euromoney. 
 
Vernazza D, Nielsen E and Vasileios G (2014) The Damaging Bias of 
Sovereign Ratings, UniCredit Global Themes Series, Economics 
Research, No. 21, 26 March 2014. 
Weaver C (2008) Hypocrisy trap: The World Bank and the poverty of 
reform. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Welt (2011) Brüderle fordert europäische Ratingagentur [Brüderle calls for 
European Credit Rating Agency], 18 December 2011. Available at: 
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13756954/Bruederleford
ert-europaeische-Ratingagentur.html (accessed 15 May 2018). 
White LJ (2010) Markets: The credit rating agencies, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 24(2): 211–226. 
 
41 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
